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Increasing deregulation will force, attention upon the problems of
achieving consumer satisfaction in industries not regulated. This
article examines the problems of regulating performance in a public
service domain of growing interest to marketers — health care. Hirschman's
concept of loose monopolies is found to be useful in explaining existing
control problems in medical practice and in pointing the way for near
term improvements.

CONSUMER SATISFACTION IN LOOSE MONOPOLIES:
THE CASE OF MEDICAL CARE
It is by now a relatively well documented part of the conventional
wisdom in business and government circles that the service sector
generates a disproportionate share of consumer dissatisfaction in vir-
tually every economy. Auto, home, and appliance repairs, moving and
storage and funeral services typically rank in the top 10 or 20 cate-
gories generating unsolicited complaints to public agencies [Advertising
Age 1979; Marketing News 1980]. In a more systematic study of both
voiced and unvoiced complaints, Andreasen and Best [1977] found that
while services accounted for 27 percent of the purchases in their
national study, they generated 32 percent of volunteered cases of non-
price problems. In- a separate analysis, Andreasen found that among ten
selected products and services where complaint-handling experience was
factored in, three of the five worst performing categories were services
[Andreasen 1977],
Since it is also well documented that the service sector is growing
very rapidly in importance in world economies [Eiglier et al 1977], we
may also expect that increasing attention will be given to the problems
of reducing consumer dissatisfaction with these services. The diffi-
culties of this task in both measurement and control are only slowly
being realized. However, some halting efforts at solutions are underway
[e.g., Day and Bodur 1977; Braden 1977; Lovelock and Young 1979].
To this point, however, most attention by marketing scholars and
researchers as well as some public policymakers has been given to pri-
vate sector services. Yet as marketers are increasingly drawn into the
non-profit area, there is growing cognizance of the fact that this, too,
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is a domain in which consumer dissatisfaction with services is quite
marked. Indeed, the public is constantly being bombarde with books
and articles calling our attention to the "fact" that Johnny can't
read, that social welfare is a scandal, that public safety has sadly
deteriorated, and that little is being done about any of this! Thus
as marketers move into these new areas, we may expect that at least
some will turn their attention to these issues of "consumer"
satisfaction. Indeed, some initial steps have already been taken in
this direction by Day and Bodur (1977); Pfaff and Blevice (1977) and
Arndt and Gronhang (1979). However, this work has in the main focused
on the problems of measuring the extent and nature of dissatisfaction
in the public sector not on its reduction and control.
Attention to the control issue is particularly appropriate at this
stage of marketing's development because of a third force that, along
with the shift to services and to public-sector is likely to have a
very significant effect on how marketing performance will be evaluated
in the months and years immediately ahead [Andreasen 1980]. This force
is the political and social pressure currently being brought to bear
to deregulate a number of industries. It may be expected that
marketing professionals will increasingly be asked in future to shed
light on three issues: (a) what industries should be deregulated; (b)
how and to what extent should such deregulation take place; and,
finally (c) what can be done to decrease consumer dissatisfaction and
market performance of those industries that are not deregulated.
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The present paper takes up the last of these questions, focusing on
a particular industry that reflects the other two trends affecting
marketing in the 1980' s: the growth of services and the involvement of
marketing professionals in the public sector.
I
Medical Care: A Case Study
The case in point is medical care. Marketers have become increasingly
involved in medical marketing programs at the federal, state and local
levels including helping the National Institutes of Health to get
people .with high blood pressure to follow a control regimen, to get
smokers to give up or cut down on their smoking habit and to get women
to practice breast self-examination [Bloom and Novelli, forthcoming;
Andreasen, 1980a] . They have given advice to neighborhood health cen-
ters and have become both line or staff managers of consultants to
local hospitals and clinics. At the same time, it is clear that health
care is a major and growing source of consumer dissatisfaction.
"Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the health
care crisis in America is the questionable quality
of much health care. .. [Some] Americans without
realizing it are getting poor medical care. Other
Americans are given services, particularly surgery,
when there is no need for it, and still others are
given incomplete health services. It is not neces-
sarily a matter of income. Even the affluent receive
poor care in many cases. [Kennedy 1972, p. 152]
In part, this concern is growing because of the extremely rapid growth
of health care costs [Herzlinger 1978]. But, in part, it is also
growing because of increases in the sophistication of medical con-
sumers. As Gribben noted in 1975:
:
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Patients—consumers—no longer choose to regard
doctors as gods, hiring them, taking their medi-
cine whether it works or not, and sometimes their
guff, too and then shutting up and paying the bill
[Gribbin, 1975, p. 10].
Indeed, the increased involvement of marketers in health care may be
seen as an indicator of growing sensitivity of providers that success
for them and their organizations and for society as a whole will only
come about with increased attention to the satisfaction of consumer
needs and wants.
Normative Questions
If we are to offer concrete suggestions for improving consumer
satisfaction with medical care, we must first consider what long run
consumer satisfaction looks like. To say that consumers want something
called "optimum physical and mental health" is to consider only one
goal, refering to an outcome of the health care marketing system. As
has been pointed out elsewhere [Andreasen, 1979], marketing must (and
will) also be held accountable for the process whereby these outcomes
are delivered. Friedson makes the point for health care: "Medical
service must be of the best possible technical quality, true, but it
must also be of the most satisfying possible human quality... it is...
a
moral necessity" [Friedson 1970, p. 209].
Indeed, a review of past efforts by medical sociologists and others
to develop quality control systems in health care indicates that pro-
cess and outcome measurements constitute two of the principal indicia
they have used. The third indicator is what Donabedian [1969] calls a
"structural" measurement, an evaluation of the facilities, systems and
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staff qualifications of health providers that are presumed to lead to
better quality health care.
These measurements have been applied to evaluate three types of
programs designed to secure long run optimum physical and mental health:
1. Preventative programs that seek to keep target audiences from
contracting health deficiencies of any kind;
2. Detective programs that seek to discover target audience members
who have contracted health deficiencies and to get them involved
in some curative program.
3. Curative programs that seek to remove or control contracted health
deficiencies and keep them removed or controlled.
However, it is generally acknowledged that the key to these
programs, indeed the major marketing contact between the health care
system and consumers is, the doctor-patient relationship. And while
the medical community is becoming much more active as a "channel of
distribution" for preventive and detective programs [Bloom and Novelli
forthcoming; Andreasen 1980a] , the bulk of such encounters involve a
sickness episode and curative programs. As Jonas has said, the medi-
cal practice "...is the focus, the raison d'etre, of any health care
delivery system, whoever controls medical practice, therefore,
controls the keystone on which the rest depends" [Jonas 1977, p. 382].
Jonas puts his finger on the key issue: who is to control medical
practice? That is, who is going to police the quality of care, both
outcomes and process, to ensure long rum consumer satisfaction? Six
possibilities present themselves:
1. Medical practitioners themselves.
2. Other members of the private sector health care systems, hos-
pital boards, insurers, and HMO administrators.
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3. Government regulators.
4. The marketplace.
5. Organized consumer groups.
6. Individual consumer groups.
Each of these will be taken up briefly In turn, in each case, asking
to what extent the "controllers" can reduce consumer dissatisfaction at
the individual and the aggregate level. Reducing disatisfaction
rather than maximizing satisfaction. One might try to develop control
systems that in some sense maximize consumer satisfaction. However,
as Andreasen has argued [1975] this is an elusive goal, depending as
it does on consumer knowledge and expectations as well as on the per-
formance of the system. It is more realistic to try to develop a
control system that corrects problems—removes dissatisfactions. This
control can be exerted at two points: (a) before problems occur by
causing practitioners to change undesirable practices or by elimi-
nating those who are unwilling or unable to change (aggregate level
control ) ; and (b) after problems occur by establishing mechanisms
where-by specific patient dissatisfactions/problems are removed
( individual level control ). Thus, each of the possible "controllers"
should be judged on their efficacy at achieving satisfactory control
at both levels.
1. Medical Practitioner Control ,
Physicians argue that implicit and explicit pressures within the
medical community itself are sufficient to assure quality care. Three
mechanisms are seen as contributing to these pressures:
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a. Medical education combined with the Hippocratic Oath supposedly will
train practitioners to be selfless servants of suffering humanity.
b. Social and professional interaction with other physicians will pro-
vide examples, inquiries, and admonishments that will encourage
peers to keep up with the latest standards of practice and to pro-
duce only good word-of-mouth from patients, hospitals and personal
staffs.
c. The desire to be admitted to successful or potentially successful
practices, partnerships or clinics and/or for to be the benefit any
of a growing stream of lucrative patient referrals will force
physicians to keep their skills up, to correct undesirable behaviors
and to pay attention to consumer dissatisfactions to assure good
word-of—mouth recommendations.
However, while collectively these mechanisms can have some effect
on some physicians, many practitioners develop approaches to patient
care that either consciously or unconsciously counter the effects of
these controls and get in the way of their truly meeting the latters'
needs and wants. As Friedson has noted: "...good intentions on the
part of administration and profession cannot overcome their inevitable
bias in perspective. Each perspective has its own legitimate interest
that prevents it from adequate sensitivity to the perspective of the
patient" [Friedson 1977, p. 726].
Some of these inhibiting perspectives could be described in medical
jargon as syndromes.
1. The Holier-Than-Thou Syndrome . Many physicians believe that
patients do not really know what is in fact in their own best
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interests. Patients find illness threatening and so have a dis-
torted perception of their true needs. Further, they simply lack
the technical knowledge of the physician to judge what is needed
and what is not [Korsch, Gozzi and Francis 1968]. Physicians can
therefore ignore their complaints.
2. The They' re-Not-Paying-For-It-Anyway Syndrome . Since third party
insurers frequently bear much of the cost for medical care,
patients can (and should) be scheduled for tests or for medication
or for return office visits that may have only marginal value.
Time and inconvenience costs to patients are ignored as are their
complaints about excessive tests and medicines and about medical
costs in general.
3. The Higher-Opportunity-Cost Syndrome . Since physicians perceive
themselves as in the business of saving lives, they frequently
'assume that their time is much more valuable than that of patients.
The latter therefore should not complain about adjusting to the
physician's convenience or paying high fees for his or her services.
4. The I-Want-to-be-Alone Syndrome . Four out of five physicians are
in solo practices. Many are there because they cherish the indepen-
dence that makes them immune to the peer pressures on which much of
medical community control relies.
5. The They're-Out-to-Get-Me Syndrome . Many physicians seem to behave
as if all patients have a lawyer friend or relative ready to bring
a malpractice suit at the drop of a suture. Such physicians will
schedule excessive self-protective tests and procedures and will
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tend by demeanor to discourage any consumer questioning of their
medical care that might escalate into a malpractice claim.
6. The Mystique-of-Omnipotence Syndrome . Since a positive patient
attitude towards the illness and its cure is often an important
contributor to the cure itself, many physicians believe that
unswerving faith in the physician is essential to such a positive
outcome. Creating a mystique of omnipotence requires that one
brook no questioning of the physician's methods and outcomes.
Finally, it should be noted that the peer-pressure mechanisms can
well backfire if poor word-of-mouth and a dropping off of referrals and
other peer contacts only leads the below-average practitioner to with-
draw from peer contact making his or her weak performance even less
observable and therefore less subject to any further peer review and
pressure.
2. Control by Other Members of the Health Care System
It has been suggested that physician behavior could be regulated by
other members of the health care system who, in fact, could withold
some of the rewards available to physicians. For example, health
insurance companies could exert an influence on physicians who schedule
unnecessary procedures or tests, charge excessively and/or prescribe
unneeded or too-costly drugs by refusing to pay for or otherwise
holding down the physicians' remuneration for such poor quality care.
They could also accept consumer complaints about problems with specific
treatments, refusing reimbursement to physicians until the complaints
were satisfactorily resolved. Thus, insurers, if they were willing,
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could exert some control over both aggregate and invidiual consumer
dissatisfaction. And, indeed, there is precedence for accepting such
responsibility in the industry. Insurers have consciously encouraged
safe driving, the design of safer cars and non-smoking by offering
reduced rates to individuals behaving in "better" ways or owning
"better" products. They have also actively lobbied for safer cars
(e.g., for airbags) and sponsored advertising to encourage people to
wear seat belts. Incentives for individual health insurers to adopt
such an aggressive stance are available if they felt that patients
and/or employers would shift patronage to the more responsible firms or
that state insurance commissioners would treat them more favorably in
rate and service hearings.
There are, of course, serious practical impediments to the implemen-
tation of such a control system. First is the question of whether there
really is much incentive for the insurance industry to police physicians
if consumers and employers will not change patronage on the basis of
insurer responsibility. This in effect shifts the real control burden
to the marketplace where, as we shall see below, a significant number
of non-competitive forces exist. Second, for insurers to exercise the
proposed control there would be need in most states to secure permission
from state commissioners to adopt such a policy (since it presumably
involves changes in contracts with insurees). This makes the change in
effect a political issue and brings the insurers in conflict with
powerful medical lobbies. This is not an insurmountable obstacle.
But again it would require a major groundswell of countervailing sup-
port from the general public.
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Finally, there is the question of whether a system reliant in part
upon consumer complaints would work. That is, would consumers complain?
At the moment, as we shall note below, the answer is: not likely!
A second, similar source of policing could be the hospitals with
which most physicians are affiliated. One problem of course is that
only a fixed and perhaps small proportion of consumer dissatisfactions
with physicians involve hospital care. More importantly, there is the
question of whether hospitals can and will exert real control over
their physician-staffs since as Goldsmith [1980] notes: "Physicians...
determine how and how much a hospital is used [and therefore] exert
enormous power in allocating resources. .. [they] are often beyond
managers' control" [p. 101]. And to the extent that key hospital admi-
nistrators are also physicians, many of the inhibitors affecting a con-
sumer orientation mentioned in the previous section would undoubtedly
apply.
A new force on the scene that many believe holds significant promise
in policing physician behavior is the Health Maintenance Organization
(HMO). The HMO movement after a slow start is now growing rapidly
(Business Week, 1980). Therefore, access to the HMO movement's growing
clientele will be very important to many physicians. This yields con-
siderable potential for control. Faltermayer (1978) states the ideal
case:
Such plans would be run by administrators close to the
scene and staffed with doctors who were forced to stay
within each year's subscription income or see the or-
ganizations go broke. These better medical mousetraps,
the prophets said, would not only strive to avoid the
waste that is rampant elsewhere, but would also, by their
mere competitive presence induce the rest of the system
to mend its ways [p. 115].
-12-
In Minneapolis-St. Paul where there are currently eight HMOs,
Falterraayer reports the following outcomes clearly benefiting consumer
welfare:
- "Conventional insurers in the area have started to crack down
on waste, particularly the excessive hospitalization of patients."
- "Some HMOs have begun to stress what physicians call compliance
—
telephoning to make sure the patient is actually taking the
medicine or doing the exercises the doctor orders."
- "They are also helping to keep incompetent doctors from prac-
ticing medicine. . .they have fired physicians."
- "[In one HMO] a doctor's fee can be withheld in toto if he sends
a patient to a hospital for non-emergency reasons without 'pre-
admission certification'."
- "[One physician has said]... if that's what it takes to make the
plan work. ..I'll do it. We physicians must provide a service the
public is demanding, or we may be on the outside looking in."
[pp. 115, 120]
It may be that these phenomena will be short-lived, reflecting only
initial skirmishes in a growth area. I_f practitioners come "to perceive
patient-subscribers as virtual captives to the HMO they've chosen to
join (at least for a year), much of depersonalization and maltreatment
problems that have been experienced for years by ghetto residents cap-
tive in free neighborhood clinics may emerge as consumer features of
middle-class HMO's. There are other problems. HMO administrators may
prove just as reluctant as hospital directors to crack down on the phy-
sicians whose minimal performance is essential to make the HMO survive.
Further, HMO's will not enroll all patients. Remaining patients choosing
physicians in the popular solo practices may find the latter effectively
immune to indirect system pressures from the HMO movement.
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The Government
Through its licensing powers for individual practitioners and its
funding of many health care programs and facilities, the government
has considerable potential to regulate the quality of physician per-
formance. There are, however, several difficulties.
With respect to licenses, each state has delegated responsibility
to Medical Boards which examine entry level candidates, issue licenses
and—in theory—maintain quality standards through their ability to
eventually revoke licenses. However:
1. Physicians dominate virtually every state Medical Board
[Derbyshire 1969].
2. "There is little evidence of accountability, either to the
public or the legislature; indeed in most instances Medical
Board proceedings are entirely confidential." [Jonas 1977,
p. 383]
3. As already noted, there is a "reluctance to enforce sanctions
against fellow practitioners (perhaps in part because of
close professional and personal interrelationships)" [Ellwood,
et al. 1973, pp. 30-31]
4. Many states do not have sanctions less severe than revokation
of licenses and Boards are extremely reluctant to depriving
someone of his or her livelihood.
5. Many boards apparently fear lawsuits from delicensed physicians,
Whatever the reasons, the evidence makes it clear that these sanc-
tions are very rarely used to police poor patient care. For example,
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The New York Times (1976) has reported that between 1971 and 1974 there
was an average of only 72 licenses revoked each year by State Boards
with fewer than two percent of these for incompetence.
Licensing of institutions is often carried-out by government agen-
cies or voluntary accrediting bodies. In the main, however, whatever
review is carried out here is based on what Donabedian [1969] calls the
"structural approach," which as noted earlier effectively ignores "pro-
cess" and "outcome" considerations.
Other involvements of government agencies in health care quality
control include:
1. Auditing is carried out of billing and medication practices of
doctors receiving exceptionally high repayments from Medicare
and Medicaid. Such audits, however, only affect a few physi-
cians and then only consider a very narrow set of non-
qualitative problems.
2. Comprehensive health planning legislation establishes regional
planning councils to analyze community problems, set goals and
approve specific facilities. In a recent evaluation of CHP's
Brown (1978), however, concluded:
To date, the experience has not been heartening....
Most CHP's [Community Health Planners] had governing
boards composed of the power structure of the health
care system—doctors, nurses, hospital administrators,
consumers and so forth—and each had priorities that
differed significantly from those of his colleagues.
Under such circumstances, a list of all problems with
a failure to set priorities was an obvious outcome.
In addition. .. their efforts were futile from the on-
set. The law gave no power to the CHP to implement
any recommendations [pp. 38-39].
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These CHP's were replaced in 1975 by health systems agencies (HSA's).
The local HSA's apparently have developed much of the same problems as
the CHP's. Funding is inadequate and the boards running each are "de
facto profession-dominated, despite consumers being in the majority"
[Brown 1978, p. 42].
3. HEW has begun to implement Professional Standards Review Boards
(PSRO's) in 203 geographic areas. PSRO's were established to
facilitate professional peer review of the process and outcomes
of physician hospital practices. PSRO's have been somewhat
more rigorous than state Medical Boards in policing medical
care but have frequently succumbed to many of the inhibitions
and provider domination the latter have experienced. [Decker
and Bonner 1973]
4. Outside the U.S., it is, of course, not uncommon for the
government to directly control all of medical care through
some form of national health care or national health insurance.
In his comparative studies of health care in welfare states
and socialist countries, Roemer concludes: "As the financing
of health care by the whole population becomes more collectivized,
pressures mount for greater regulation to control both the
costs and quality of services (1977, p. 80)." In England, for
example, the government limits the number of patients a GP can
have. In Germany, "computerized reviews [are conducted] of
each doctor's practice habits, as measured by such criteria
as the number of drug prescriptions per case, number of office
visits and laboratory tests per case, rates of certain surgical
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procedures and so on. ...Such identification is regarded only
as a screening step, to be followed up by detailed examination
of the individual doctor's work (Roemer 1977, p. 177)."
Penalties include payment of only fractions of claims or,
ultimately, elimination from the social insurance program
altogether.
It is, however, unlikely in the present U.S. political
environment that any kind of national health insurance, except
possibly for catastrophic illness, is a realistic possibility
despite advocacy by many prominent politicians (Kennedy 1972).
The Marketplace
A regulatory mechanism that many would like to adopt from the pri-
vate sector is the classic marketplace mechanism. Indeed, Roemer (1977,
p. 176) characterizes the U.S. system as "laissez-faire." In an ideal
medical market, patients unhappy with their "supplier" could exercise
what Hirschman (1970) calls the "exit" option; they could not buy the
"product" or take their business elsewhere. Eventually, those pro-
viding inadequate medical care would either reform or go out of
business. Temporary revenue gains by remaining physicians would be
relatively quickly captured by new suppliers coming into the
marketplace.
The problem, of course, is that on both the supply and demand sides,
the assumptions of competitive markets are clearly violated in medicine.
1. Restricted Entry . State licensing of physicians (by other physi-
cians, as we have seen) clearly restricts entry of new physicians.
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Further, the fact that licensing is by state implicitly restricts
geographic mobility of practitioners who cannot easily flow with
consumer demand. Finally, even in the absence of such barriers,
the long gestation period needed to train an M.D. would make entry
adjustments "sticky" at best. As Friedson points out [1970, pp.
194-5], a real consequence of a shortage or maldistribution of
physicians is that in many communities doctors will be seriously
overburdened. As a result, they invevitably will cut down on
services. They will spend less time with each patient in part by
assigning routine contacts to paraprofessionals, cutting out calls
outside the office, insisting on prearranged appointments, dis-
couraging trivial complaints and overall giving each patient less
counselling time even for serious ailments.
"His services assume more of a take-it-or-leave-it
character than is the case in other circumstances,
and the patient must fit his anxieties-, ignorance,
and desires into the physician's brief encounter
with rather less give-and-take than would exist in
a market place where more choices were available to
him (Friedson 1970, p. 195).
2. Restricted Information . Until recently, physicians could not
advertise and the vast majority still do not do so. Most patients
are inhibited by custom and social norms from visiting many "show-
rooms" before buying. Published evaluations of community physicians
have been unknown until very recently.
3. Buyer Ignorance . Most consumers do not know enough to detect poor
care if offered. And, as we have noted, the attitude of many phy-
sicians is expressly designed to discourage the acquisition of the
requisite knowledge. Further, consumers may not believe that
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records and x-rays can be transferred, thus making them overestimate
the cost of switching. It may also be that, again as encouraged by
physicians, many patients overvalue the rapport they have established
or the history they have shared with their physician as a loss to
be given up under an "exit" option.
4. Long Repurchase Cycles . For many maladies, poor performance by the
physician may take a very long time to appear, again causing the
demand side of the market adjustment mechanism to react slowly.
5. Lack of Impact . For the exit strategy to police the market, it
must be both observable and meaningful to the physician. Given
that there are monopolistic elements on the supply side, physicians
once established may have- enough "new business" to effectively
mask any defections due to patient dissatisfaction. Further, even
if physicians do note patient attrition, they may simply ignore
- it since they have already accumulated enough income by charging
high fees for a large volume of sales that are afforded by the
restricted supply of competitors.
6. Psychological Inhibitions . Many dissatisfied consumers may find it
psychologically painful to change physicians because:
a) an exit decision implies a "slap" at another human being with
whom one has discussed relatively intimate topics;
b) as compared to changing, say, gasoline service stations, changing
physicians cannot easily be done anonymously, especially if one
wishes to transfer records and history;
c) for many, especially the elderly, the doctor-patient relation-
ship may be perceived as a friendship to be valued independent
of the quality of care.
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Organized Consumers
As suggested earlier, many regional health care planning organiza-
tions as well as many hospitals rely on organized groups of consumers
—
consumer panels—to give them planning input and sometimes health care
evaluations. The problems here are twofold. First, there is a serious
danger that consumer representatives will be co-opted by the medical
professionals. The latter will have more "expertise" on most topics,
more experience, and longer tenure that can easily intimidate consumer
non-professionals. Second, where this does not happen but i^s seen as
a potential threat by consumer representatives, the latter' s positions
may polarize, and an adversarial style of group confrontation may
develop. Neither cooptation nor polarization is likely to lead to
increased consumer satisfaction. In any eventuality it does not at
all guarantee satisfaction of individual consumer problems.
Individual Consumers
To secure individual satisfaction in industries where the exit
option Is not a realistic possibility, the patient's major alternative
is what Hirschman [1970] calls the "voice" options. That is, a con-
sumer can obtain redress of a grievance or can police poor practice
only by complaining to practitioners or to independent complaint-handling
agencies; or, in the extreme, filing a malpractice suit, an increasingly
common occurrence (de Lessups 1977). As Hirschman indicates, the more
elastic the demand, the more the exit option is used but "with a given
potential for articulation, the actual level of voice feeds on inelastic
demand, or on the lack of opportunity for exit" (1970, p. 34).
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The problem is that many of the features that inhibit exiting also
inhibit voicing. That is, consumer-patients may be reluctant to speak
'I
up since:
1. they do not trust their own judgments,
|
2. they are convinced physicians are close to omnipotent,
3. they do not want to hurt their physician's feelings,
4. they cannot voice anonymously.
In addition, many physicians' responses to patients' past efforts
at voicing dissatisfaction or simply raising questions about treatment
may discourage such efforts. As we have noted, physicians' behavior
may be the result of being overburdened because of supply side
restrictions on the number of doctors.
Whatever the reasons, it is clearly the case that patients are
reluctant to speak up. In Andreasen and Best's 1977 study of consumer
satisfactions and complaint behavior (Andreasen and Best 1977), 14.9
percent of the respondents reported that they had experienced some form
of non-price problem with their medical or dental care (i.e., they
didn't merely say that it cost too much). As indicated in Table 1
this compares with an overall problem rate of 20.9 percent for all
services (or 22.85 for non-medical-dental services). Whether this
reflects generally higher satisfaction with medical care or merely
patients inability (and/or unwillingness ) to recognize poor care is
not clear from the data.
Table 1 about here
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The striking feature of Table 1, however, is not the relatively
positive perception of medical and dental care but the rarity with
which people speak up about these problems. Only one in three voiced
their complaints either to the practitioners or to third parties. The
rate for all other services and for high cost, infrequently purchased
products is almost one in two . The poor voicing experience is only
slightly better than the lowest rate in the entire study, that for
legal services, a category also beset with many of the same supply-side
market restrictions as medicine.
These results are surprising in that the problems in both cate-
gories are presumably very serious. In many of the other product and
service categories reported in the study, one would expect many con-
sumers to not bother voicing because of the triviality of the problem
compared to the cost and effort of voicing. Thus, the one-in-two
voicing figure for other services probably substantially understates
what the voicing rate would be for service problems that were of equal
seriousness as those involving medical/dental care and legal services.
Table 1 also offers support for the contention that patients are
often actively discouraged from further complaining by their physician's
responses to earlier protests. As indicated in the last column of
Table 1, only 34.5 percent of all voiced complaints that were resolved
at the time of the survey were perceived by the patients as satisfac-
torily handled. This again was the second worst figure in the entire
study, after car parking. When the results in the last two columns are
combined, we see that only 11.3 percent of all non-price problems medi-
cal and dental patients perceive are ever voiced and satisfactorily
-22-
resolved. This is one-half the rate for all other services in the
study and the latter, one will recall, presumably include a great many
relatively trivial problems. This means, among other things, that in
health care, there is a very large amount of unresolved dissatisfaction
that patients harbor long after their encounters with the health care
system. If "pending" cases in the Andreasen/Best study turn out as
those already resolved, it may be that as many as thirteen percent of
all patients will have some unresolved problem rankling them at any
point in time.
CONCLUSION
What, then, can one say about an ideal control system for medical
care? Clearly, each of the six mechanisms outlined above has its weak-
nesses. Those designed to weed out poor practitioners have frequently
been ineffective because of inadequate (or unwilling) peer control,
because of the malfunctions of the medical marketplace, and because of
inhibitions placed upon organized or individual consumer voicing.
What is to be done? In my opinion, the Ideal toward which the
system should adapt is that of the private marketplace. This system
through the exercise of both voice and exit option would allow both the
addressing of individual grievances and the weeding out of poor
providers. The difficulty is that the health care market as It pre-
sently operates is what might be called an imperfect or, in Hirschman's
terra, a "loose" monopoly. By this is meant that it is possible for
patients to exit, but It is unlikely that they will do so. And, as we
have seen, when they don't exit, they don't voice and when they do
voice it doesn't very often help.
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Hirschman has an explanation for this phenomenon. He points out
that in terms of exit and voice, a tight monopoly is preferable to an
imperfect or loose one since those "locked into" the monopoly will have
considerable incentive to exercise the voice option. Where exit is
possible for some: "those customers who care most about the quality of
the product and, who, therefore are those who would be the most active,
reliable, and creative agents of voice are for that very reason also
those who are apparently likely to exit first in the case of deteriora-
tion" (Hi'rschman 1970, p. ). Hirschman cites examples as diverse as
the Nigerian railway system and U.S. education to demonstrate his point.
The present analysis suggests that one might add U.S. medical care to
the list.
The results in Table 1 may well be evidence that those patients who
would have been vocal are exiting perhaps because they correctly per-
ceive that voicing doesn't often work. Those who remain effectively
locked into the system, if nothing else by their own inhibitions, are
the less vocal As shown in Table 1, they do not exercise the voice
option and are not influential when they do.
The answer to this problem is to find a mechanism that will keep
quality-conscious patients from merely exiting physicians offering
deteriorating service while giving the remaining patients some effective
voice in redressing their legitimate grievances. An innovative solution
would be to require that as a condition of retaining their professional
status, physicians secure systematic feedback on the quality of care
received from all patients whom they treat. The procedure for securing
this feedback could be left to state legislatures which in turn and
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where appropriate could delegate the responsibility to individual
hospitals, clinics, HMOs and group practices. While the procedures
might vary in detail, each should require that at minimum every patient
be given a form to fill in that would be sent to an independent review
body. This form would have the patient rate the medical care received,
point out problems where they arise and ask for redress where it is
merited. In effect, patients would be put in the position of turning
the tables on physicians and prescribing regimens and medicines to
cure their ills.
Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSRO's) also could be
the organizations given the necessary authority to implement and use
this system. Experimentation with various concrete approaches is clearly
necessary, particularly in order to observe the vigor and efficacy with
which the review agencies carry out the "prescriptions." However,
having patients prescribing for physicians clearly has the potential
of keeping quality conscious consumers from simply exiting a less—
than-ideal situation, while giving the less vocal patients an anonymous,
yet effective, vehicle for speaking their concerns. We still need to
educate both vocal and less-vocal groups to be better evaluators of
medical care and therefore better problem detectors. Still the system
proposed here is a modest and, it would appear, realistic adaptation
to the present loose monopoly conditions in the medical care system
that paradoxically can achieve many of the virtues of the oft-feared
complete monopoly.
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Full competition with easy supply entry and easy demand exit would
in the long run be preferable. But there are obvious virtues in
restricting entry by licensing practitioners in a profession which
literally life-and-death powers. Given that we are also unlikely in
the near future to "progess" to a complete monopoly under a national
health care program, we must adapt to loose monopoly conditions. In the
process we must also be realistic and adapt to the present attitudes
and behaviors of the doctor population and the social norms that
restrict exit behavior. Systematic feedback and its rigorous utiliza-
tion appears to be the only realistic alternative that can make a
substantial improvement in consumer satisfaction in this crucial
domain.
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Table 1
Complaint Experience for Selected Products and Services
No. of % Non Price % Satisfactoril
Cases Z Satisfactory Problems % Voiced5 Resolved**
Infrequently Purchased
Products 7241 89.8 19.9 49.5 57.5
Frequently Purchased
Products 13550 87.6 20.0 35.3 65.8
Car Repair 1277 75.1 35.0 60.0 49.8
Appliance Repair 563 75.7 29.5 65.5 35.5
Home Repair 537 79.8 28.4 64.8 52.6
Car Parking 683 75.5 23.4 53.7 29.8
Film Developing 1250 89.1 18.5 36.2 45.2
Legal Services 388 87.6 15.4 28.8 *
Credit 1191
.
90.5 10.6 53.7 49.3
Medical or Dental Care 1910 90.6 14.9 32.7 34.5
All Services 7783 84.5 20.9 47.7 43.9
*Fewer than 13 resolved cases.
Base: Respondents with non-price problems.
Base: Respondents voicing complaints.
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